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CHAPTER THREE

Edmund Husserl and phenomenology
Dermot Moran
The Moravian-born mathematician and philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859 Husserl ( -1938 devoted his life to exhaustive phenomenological investigations -employing a method that he essentially invented -that offer some of the most sustained and radical discussions of central topics in the philosophy of mind that can be found in twentieth-century philosophy. 1 Yet, it is still the case that most analytic philosophers of mind (who see themselves as having invented that discipline in the mid-twentieth century (see Chapter 1)) proceed to discuss the very same topics with no inkling of Husserl ' s extraordinary and enduring contribution. 2 In this chapter, I want to outline some of Husserl ' s major contributions to the philosophy of mind. I should also add that Husserl ' s work on consciousness is now being carefully studied especially by those interested in the cognitive sciences. 3 Phenomenology, understood as the careful description of experiences in the manner in which they are experienced by the subject, proposes to study, in Husserl ' s words, the whole of our ' life of consciousness ' ( Bewusstseinsleben , Hua XIV 46) 4 ; that is to say, it includes not just explicit cognitive states and acts, such as judgements, but all the myriad acts and states of consciousness such as sensory awareness, perception, memory, imagination, feeling, emotion, mood, free will, time-consciousness, 5 judgement, reasoning, symbolic thought, self-conscious awareness, as well as subconscious drives and desires, and I am by no means giving an exhaustive list here. Husserl also thought that psychology (due to its inherent naturalistic outlook) could not be the true science of subjectivity. The new science of subjectivity has to put aside all natural scientific and ' folk ' concepts of the psychic and aims to confront genuine concrete experience. As Husserl writes:
The first thing we must do, and first of all in immediate reflective self-experience, is to take the conscious life, completely without prejudice, just as what it quite immediately gives itself, as itself, to be. 6 Husserl, moreover, not only analysed the structures of individual ' self-experience ' ( Selbsterfahrung ), one ' s experience of one ' s own conscious states, but also offered groundbreaking discussions of the experience of others or of the other ( Fremderfahrung ) which following the psychology of his day (e.g. Theodor Lipps) he called ' empathy ' ( Einf ü hlung ). He discussed the nature of the individual ' ego ' ( das Ich ) as well as how egoic experiences are melded together into a single whole of a personal life. He also discussed, in Ideas II , for instance, the special level of relations between persons where they relate to one another as persons in ' the personalistic attitude ' ( die personalistische Einstellung ).
7 Indeed, especially in his mature research, he was deeply interested in the manner in which humans relate to one another in what he called generally ' intersubjectivity ' ( Intersubjektivit ä t ), including the experience of belonging-together in a community and sharing a common world.
In his main publications, for example, Logical Investigations ,
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Ideas I 9 and Cartesian Meditations , 10 Husserl ' s approach is predominantly individualist or ' egological ' , describing conscious life primarily in the context of the individual self. This has led to Husserl being described as a Cartesian or as a ' methodological solipsist ' . He was, on the other hand, always aware -and certainly from 1910/1911 this is a distinctive theme -that this egological approach abstracts from the fuller more concrete domain of intersubjective, communal, social consciousness. Indeed, Husserl was one of the first philosophers of mind to talk about specifically Husserl himself recognized that the metaphor of a stream was in some respects quite misleading. These experiences form the seamless whole of our conscious, waking states and indeed we have to extend the concept of consciousness to include states of sleep, dreaming, hypnotic states, narcotic states, states of anaesthesia, meditative states and so on. To live, Husserl says, is to experience ( leben ist erleben ). Initially at least, Husserl ' s interest was primarily, but not exclusively, in what current philosophy now refers to as occurrent (rather than dispositional) acts of consciousness, their contents and their objective reference; that is, he primarily focused on conscious episodes as such. In his earlier years, he had nothing at all to say, at least in print, about ' the unconscious ' and very little to say, at least in his earlier years, about our dispositional or emotional states, although he later, especially in his Passive Synthesis lectures 12 and in the Crisis of European Sciences , came to discuss the complex layerings of our ' pre-predicative ' life, our drives, our being affected and being drawn towards certain things, our ' habits ' , ' convictions ' , our ' attitudes ' and other ' sedimentations ' . In his later years, Husserl was aware of what he called ' depth psychology ' ( Tiefenpsychologie ) by which he meant the various forms of psychoanalysis being practiced at the time by Freud, Jung, Adler and others.
Conscious lived experiences are, as Descartes and Kant also recognized, primarily temporal events (they are not primarily spatial, but Husserl came more and more to see how the experience of spatiality comes to be constituted out of embodied experiences especially touch sensations). 13 Conscious experiences do not simply follow one another in a chain (as Hume sometimes suggests), To clarify what is meant by the phenomenological approach, it is important to recognize that Husserl was not attempting any form of explanation in the sense of a naturalistic, causal (or what he would term ' genetic ' ) account of the composition of human lives as conscious cognitive beings. Husserl offers no explanatory account of how it is that our embodied minds are able to function. To put it crudely, the ' brain ' as an organ is not experienced directly in a first-person way by the subject (science tells us we have brains) and so it falls outside the purview of phenomenology. Husserl 14 Husserl is interested in the essences of diverse cognitive or epistemic attitudes (perceiving, remembering, imagining, judging, surmising and so on) that constitute the building blocks of our rational lives as knowers and doers (agents). He is also interested in the laws of transformation according to which one state or attitude turns into another or is modified by another (uncertainty becomes belief, perception turns to memory and so on) and also in the internal , that is necessary, relations between these cognitive attitudes themselves.
The fundamental key to unlock conscious experience is the understanding of intentionality. 15 Husserl ' s begins from the Brentanian insight that psychic states are essentially structured as intentional states. Intentionality is understood by Husserl generally as ' having something in mind ' ( etwas ' im Sinne ' zu haben , Ideas I, Hua III/1 185). Every perception, memory, thought, feeling or emotion is about something, it is directed at some object. It is ' about ' something. Husserl sees intentionality as ' the fundamental characteristic of all consciousness ' ( Ideas I § 90). It is the ' name of the problem encompassed by the whole of phenomenology ' ( Ideas I, § 146, p. 349; Hua III/1 303). As we have seen, Husserl prefers to use the Cartesian language of cogitatio and cogitatum (CM § 14; Crisis § 50). Every cogitatio intends a cogitatum . But, in his published work, Ideas I § § 87 -96, Husserl also introduces new terms borrowed from the Greek noesis and noema which he had been developing in his lectures from 1908. In his mature writings (see Crisis § 48), he speaks of the ' noetic-noematic correlation ' or the ' noetic-noematic structure [ Aufbau ] ' (CM, Hua I 78). 16 The structural features of the intended object can be studied independent of its existence. I can be seeking the perfect partner (whom I may never find) but I can be quite sure of the specific traits of that person. Cultural products, art objects, religious artefacts and so on are all intentional objects. They are invested with meaning that comes to light depending on the noetic attitude adopted towards them. To study them as they present or disclose themselves is to study them noematically.
Studying the intentional correlation between act and object is a way of gaining access to the essences of mental states. As Husserl writes in his Passive Syntheses lectures:
But if one has learned to see phenomenologically and has learned to grasp the essence of intentional analysis . . . then one will initially make the quite astounding discovery that those types of lived experience are not a matter of arbitrary special features of an accidental life of consciousness, but rather that terms like " perception, " " memory, " " expectation, " etc., express universal, essential structures, that is, strictly necessary structures of every conceivable stream of consciousness, thus, so to speak, formal structures of a life of consciousness as such whose profound study and exact conceptual circumscription, whose systematic graduated levels of foundation and genetic development, is the first great task of a transcendental phenomenology. It is precisely nothing less that the science of the essential shapes [ Gestalten ] of consciousness as such, as the science of maternal origins. (APS 365 -6; Hua XI 233) It is not, therefore, just a matter of the enumeration or ' uncovering ' ( Enth ü llung ) of the layers of our intentional life. Husserl also wants to examine their interlocking interconnection into the single, unified framework which enables not just the unity and identity of a single consciousness but also participation in the shared, universal rational life, our cognitive life ( Erkenntnisleben ).
Husserl is a holist. Intentional life is an interconnected whole , a coherent, integrated ' complex ' or ' nexus ' ( Zusammenhang ). Attitudes, beliefs, modifications, ' sedimentations ' (beliefs that have settled down into convictions and habits) are bound together or synthesized into one harmonious life in a continuously existing world. Husserl wants to uncover the basic forms of our conscious life in terms of their essential features and necessary structural interconnections. He often speaks of the different layers or ' strata ' involved in an act of consciousness. He also points out that (in perception) these strata do not just sit on top of one another but ' interpenetrate or intersaturate ' ( sie durchdringen sich oder durchtr ä nken sich , DR, p. 62; Hua XVI 75).
Following the psychology of his day (which ultimately derived from Descartes), and especially his teachers Franz Brentano Broadly speaking, we perceive objects outside of us in outer perception but we perceive the flow of our own conscious sensations, thoughts and feelings, in inner perception. In his mature phenomenology, Husserl maintained that whatever is occurrent in consciousness can be recovered by a specific act of reflection involving a change of attitude or stance ( Einstellung ä nderung ). In such a shift, we can go from seeing the tree to seeing that our seeing of the tree involves temporally changing profiles with differing sensory contents. It is this freedom to change stance -essential to our freedom as rational beings -that allows for the possibility of phenomenology. Just as when watching a film, I can go from being absorbed in the plot to reflectively examining how the camera shots are set up, the use of tracking and so on, I can vary my conscious attention from my doings in the world to my own manner of attending. It is the systematic description of what is uncovered in the reflective attitude that yields phenomenological information about how our conscious states are experienced. This is most complex. For Husserl, for instance, external perceptions are always partial and internally indicate they are never complete, whereas he thought that the information received in inner perception was complete and reliable and in this case, esse est percipi . In later years, he realized this was not completely true. I may be sure of my own grief or anger but it also (just like an external object) appears in profiles and I may reflectively come to the conclusion that my experienced anger was in fact a feeling of being hurt or whatever.
In Ideas I (1913), Husserl came to clear awareness of the relation between the na ï ve certainty of perception and the overall beliefstructure of what he came to describe as ' the natural attitude ' ( die nat ü rliche Einstellung , Ideas I § 27). One of the greatest discoveries of Edmund Husserl ' s phenomenology is that the ordinary, everyday world of experience, the world of things, plants, animals, people and places, the pre-theoretical, pre-scientific world, is not just simply there , in itself, but is the correlate of a very specific attitude, namely, the natural attitude . Husserl ' s early descriptive phenomenology was realist but he moved in a transcendental direction in his mature works when he introduced the idea of the methodological suspension of the thetic or existence-positing commitments of the natural, normal attitude to allow the shape of perception to Husserl ' s overall aim was to gain insight into the nature of cognition and especially into judgements and into the life of reason. As a committed, even radical, empiricist (he was an admirer of William James), Husserl begins his account of cognition with direct, immediate perceptual experience, which for him, as for Aristotle, Aquinas, and modern Empiricism, forms the basis of all consciousness. It is perceptual consciousness that gives us our first sense of objectivity, physicality and the experience of ' world ' :
[Perception] is what originally makes us conscious of the realities existing for us and " the " world as actually existing. To cancel out all such perception, actual and possible, means, for our total life of consciousness, to cancel out the world as objective sense and as reality accepted by us; it means to remove from all thought about the world (in every signification of this word) the original basis of sense and legitimacy. 17 Perception of transcendent objects gives us the sense of an abiding world, of a world that is our disposal in so far as we can revisit and re-perform earlier perceptions, and so have an abiding knowledge:
The fact that a re-perception, a renewed perception of the same thing, is possible for transcendence characterizes the fundamental Perception is much more than visual perception, of course, and Husserl did spend a lot of time analysing the relation between sight and touch (he has much less to say about the senses of hearing, smell and taste). With regard to vision, Husserl gives extensive, detailed descriptions of just what we see and how we see it (involving the nature of the act of perception, the nature of the perceived object, the sense of perception, the role of temporal awareness in the structure of perceiving, the dynamic nature of perceptual content, the nature of the indeterminate accompanying horizons and so on).
While phenomenologists (e.g. Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Aron Gurwitsch) have always been advocates of Husserl ' s direct realist account of perception, recently, analytically trained philosophers have begun to recognize its importance. 18 Many aspects of Husserl ' s discussion of perception are of interest to contemporary philosophers, for instance, his commitment to direct realism; his rejection of representationalism, and any view that would substitute a sign or picture for the perceptual object itself (see Ideas I § 43); his rejection of ' sensualism ' and causal accounts of perception; his rejection of conceptualism , that is, the claim that every sensory element in perceptual consciousness involves exercise of a concept; 19 and his account of the specific essence of perception as distinct from judgement. In the Logical Investigations , for instance, there is a sustained critique of the representationalist accounts of perception found in Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill and others. In Ideas I, he criticizes the atomism and representationalism of the Gestalt psychologists, Koffka, K ö hler and others). Husserl (and MerleauPonty follows him in this regard; see Chapter 4) is a virulent critic of empiricist accounts of the sense datum or ' idea ' . We do not see patches of colour or hear noises, but see the multicoloured landscape and listen to the sounds of traffic, birds or refrigerators. Husserl also rejects phenomenalist accounts, whereby the object simply consists of a series of appearances or sense data. His appreciation of the nature of the stream of consciousness led him to reject all ' sensualist ' accounts of it as a stream of contents ' without sense Consciousness is not the name for " psychic complexes, " for " contents " fused together, for " bundles " or streams of " sensations " which, without sense in themselves, also cannot lend any " sense " to whatever mixture; it is rather through and through " consciousness, " the source of all reason and unreason, all legitimacy and illegitimacy, all reality and fiction, all value and disvalue, all deed and misdeed. 20 Husserl also rejects various versions of the causal account of perception. For instance, T. H. Green maintained that ' the reference of a sensation to a sensible thing means its reference to a cause ' . 21 But Husserl is clear that perceiving does not involve an awareness of causal connection, rather there is conscious sense of unmediated presence of the object. As Fred Dretske puts it, to hear the doorbell ringing is not to hear the button being depressed even if the button being depressed initiates the causal chain that results in us hearing the doorbell. 22 Dretske claims that the reason we hear the bell and not the button is that the bell is ' primarily represented ' while the button is not:
The reason we hear the bell, not the button, is because, although our auditory experience carries information about the properties of both the bell (that it is ringing) and the button (that it is depressed), the ringing (of the bell) is represented in a primary way while the depression (of the button) is not. However, I think Husserl ' s analysis is more to the point. We don ' t hear the button at all; we hear the door bell ringing . We only know that the button is being depressed because we assume a certain scientific and causal view already. We read causation into the perceptual scene as it were, we don ' t find it there. Two main traits of perceiving that Husserl constantly stresses are that perception presents an object directly and immediately, and that the act of perceiving involves unquestioned acceptance . Or, as Husserl puts it, there are two characteristics of perception: one noetic, the other noematic. On the noetic side, the perceiving is straightforward and has the character of certainty; on the noematic or object side, the object perceived has the character of existing actuality (CM Hua I § 15). In perception, the object is experienced as given in the manner of ' itself there ' ( selbst da ). We have the immediate certainty of being in the perceptual presence of the perceived thing. Perception holds out, as it were, the promise of offering us the thing itself as it actually is, ' it itself ' ( es selbst ). According to Husserl, it belongs to the very sense of a perceptual act to involve the self-appearance of the object (Hua XIX/2 589). The object is given ' itself ' ( selbst ), ' there ' ( da ), ' in the flesh ' , ' bodily ' ( leibhaftig ), in propria persona , in the actual temporal present, in its own being and ' being so ' ( Sosein , Hua VII 251):
. . . the object stands in perception as there in the flesh, it stands, to speak still more precisely, as actually present, as self-given there in the current now. (DR § 4, p. 12; Hua XVI 14) Perception is essentially simple ' or ' straightforward ' ( schlicht , LU § 46); for Husserl, this means there is no reasoning involved in perception:
What this means is this: that the object is also an immediately given object in the sense that, as this object perceived with this definite objective content , it is not constituted in relational, connective, or otherwise articulated acts, acts founded on other acts which bring other acts to perception. (LU VI § 46; vol. II, p. 282; Hua XIX/2 674).
We receive the object ' in one blow ' ( in einem Schlage ), as he puts it. The fact that perception is straightforward means that it delivers the object at once, in the modes of actuality and certainty. But, of course, it does not mean that we see only a single object. We can have simple straightforward perception of complex objects (a pile of books, a book on the table, etc.). In his classic work Perception , H. H. Price believes that Husserl gets it right when he refers to the experience of the presence of the object in actual perception as being a ' leibhaftig ' in propria persona experience. 24 In this sense, for Price, perception resembles an intuition in its holistic or ' totalistic ' nature and lack of discursiveness.
A second crucial component of perception is that it involves ' perceptual belief ' and ' perceptual certainty ' , as Husserl 
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A third claim for which Husserl is also well known is that, in perception, the object is given as it is in itself, while at the same time it is given in profiles. Although we see the object from one side, somehow the whole object is given (see also Chapters 4 and 13). External perception has the ' sense ' ( Sinn ) whole object, even if only one side is ' properly ' seen. As Husserl makes clear, even if it is the case that the perception is only of one side under one aspect, nevertheless, it is clear that the whole object is intended and ' meant ' in the act of perceiving:
Let us begin by noting that the aspect, the perspectival adumbration through which every spatial object invariably appears, only manifests the spatial object from one side. No matter how completely we may perceive a thing, it is never given in perception with the characteristics that qualify it and make it up as a sensible thing from all sides at once. (APS § 1, p. 39; Hua XI 3)
As Gareth Evans has argued, to say that we see an object from one side is not to deny that we actually see the object itself. Husserl makes this clear in Ideas I § 138. Despite the inadequacy of each one-sided perception, what ' properly ' appears cannot be separated from the perception of the thing as a whole. The side that properly appears is really a non -self-sufficient part of the whole that is the ' sense ' of the perception ( Ideas I, p. 331; Hua III/1 286 -7). In terms of his analysis of the essence of perception, Husserl maintains that what we think of as peculiarities particular to us are actually eidetic insights that belong to the Idea of a physical thing as such. A material thing unveils itself in endless spatial profiles. Even God can only grasp a physical thing in profiles ( Ideas I § 149, p. 362; Hua III/1 315). Similarly, a material thing also reveals itself in perception in a series of temporal moments. Not even God can alter this eidetic truth (DR, Hua XVI 65). Unrolling in spatial and temporal profiles pertains to the essence of a material thing (DR, Hua XVI 66). In part, this is why Husserl is convinced that what he is doing is not psychology . Perception for Husserl is the bedrock of consciousness. All other forms of conscious experience are in one way or another founded on perceptual, sensory consciousness. Husserl contrasts the ' selfgivenness ' ( Selbstgegebenheit ) of perception with a very large class of conscious forms that he characterizes as ' representational ' ( vergegenw ä rtig ) in one way or another. Representation, or more accurately ' presentification ' , ' presentiation ' or ' calling to mind ' ( Vergegenw ä rtigung ), includes memory, fantasy, wishing and symbolic thinking -all forms that do not have the sense of the immediate presence of the object. When one remembers, imagines or fantasizes about an object, there is not the same sense of the immediate, actual, bodily and temporal presence of the object. Indeed, in memory and in expectation, the object is experienced as not presently there, but there is some kind of reference to its being, it is still being posited (as future or past) in a specific way. Unlike imagination, memory posits the real ' having-been ' of something. Imagination entails no such positing of the real existence of its object in any temporal mode. Memory is not ' picture-consciousness ' ( Bildbewusstsein ). It is a thetic or positing act, but the object is presented as ' being-past ' , ' having been ' (Hua XIII 164) and as ' having-been-perceived-by-me ' (Hua VII 252) and having been originally experienced in a mode other than memory . In other words, in an act of remembering, the experience remembered is presented as one originally experienced by me, but now with a temporal distance separating it from my current experience. This temporal distantiation is characteristic of memory:
Recollection is not simply the being-conscious once again of the object; rather, just as the perception of a temporal object carries with it its temporal horizon, so too the recollection repeats the consciousness of this horizon. (ZB, p. 113; Hua X 108)
The object experienced in a fantasy (which includes reverie, daydream, act of deliberate imagining, fictional creation, etc.) is not necessarily past, present or future, but is presented ' as-if ' (DR § 4), and is not an actual perception. This is a structural feature of fantasy itself: it has the character of ' depicting ' . In fantasy, there is no positing of the object. Moreover, the object of the fantasy is not located precisely as it would be in a perception. It ' hovers ' or floats before the fantasist; it is not continuous with the objects or the space around it. Secondly, there is no temporal distance or gap experienced as there is in the case of memory. The fantasized image is apprehended in the present tense although that present is not itself experienced as perceptual present tense. On the other hand, the fantasized image can reappear and be recovered in memory. Picture consciousness or ' depicting consciousness ' ( Bildbewusstsein ) is another sui generis form of representative consciousness for which Husserl offers a very complex and challenging analysisthat received a recent reformulation on the concept of ' seeing-in ' as developed by Richard Wollheim (1923 -2003 . 26 According to Husserl, a photograph or a postcard of a bridge is a complex object with multiple modes of givenness. There is a perceived physical object (postcard) and also a represented picture (bridge). There is involved a blend of perceiving and imaging. The postcard is a genuine object that can be seen, touched, tasted, etc. But it is also a ' picture-thing ' ( Bildding , Hua XXIII 489) hosting an image -the bridge -that floats somewhat free of the physical object. We can see past the brush-strokes to the face presented in the painting. This is a seeing-in. It is different from fantasy. The image in fantasy needs no physical substrate and belongs within consciousness itself and does not survive the act of fantasizing, whereas a depicted object based on a physical object does survive.
Another important form of ' representation ' or ' presentiation ' ( Vergegenw ä rtigung ) is our experience of other ' s conscious experiences. Husserl, following the psychological tradition of his day, calls this ' empathy ' ( Einf ü hlung ). 27 Husserl ' s phenomenology has often been caricatured as solipsistic, either metaphysically or methodologically. He is seen as the last proponent of an essentially Cartesian ' philosophy of consciousness ' that prioritizes phenomena as given to the individual ego as well as privileging the ego ' s selfpresence to itself as the highest form of being understood as presence. But Husserl did devote considerable attention to the discussion of empathy , to intersubjectivity and to the experience of what is ' other ' , ' foreign ' or ' strange ' ( das Fremde , das Andere ), what he calls generally ' other-experience ' ( Fremderfahrung ). He contrasts this ' originary ' ( origin ä r ) or ' primordial ' manner of self-givenness in self-experience with ' other experience ' , which he regards as ' non-originary ' ( nicht origin ä r ). In the sense that I can never do more than reproduce the first-person life of the other which he or she experiences in a first-person, originary way, I cannot directly experience the other ' s first-person experiences. We can of course share experiences. Two siblings can share the grief of the death of their father; but both have individual griefs, and the analysis of the intentional structure of their griefs may differ even if they have the same intentional object, intensity and so on. Moreover, each is conscious not just of his or her grief but also of the other ' s grief as a distinct object. A sister can sympathize with a brother ' s grief but still find it cloying, and so on.
Husserl explores different ways in which the empathic understanding of the other can be achieved. One way is through the analogical pairing between my lived body and that of the other. In a handshake -each feels the other intending to make the contact. Of course, this is possible in many different ways -I can feel the reluctance of the other, the forced familiarity, the limp lifeless hand contact and so on, but in these cases my body is responding to the living bodily intentionality of the other. Another way Husserl explores empathy is through various modalizations of my self-experience. Husserl believes that the ' I ' is primarily experienced in the present tense, in its immediate self-presence, and that, through a peculiar kind of synthesis, it identifies itself with the ego that intrinsically belongs to past experiences. I consciously take myself to be the same person as the child I am now remembering that I once was. This occurs through a kind of ' modalization ' or ' variation ' of myself that is governed by a priori essential laws that it is the business of phenomenology to identify. This self-identification over time gives Husserl a clue to how the other person is also constituted within my experience. Just as I identify with my earlier self in a memory, so also I can identify with the other in various forms of social experience. Husserl always sees empathy as the bridge to the other: ' Empathy creates the first true transcendence (thus transcendence in a unique sense) ' (Hua XIV 8). In fact, the solipsistic way of approaching oneself is a onesided abstraction for Husserl. The self is never experienced without the other. Self and other are always ' interwoven ' and have an intimate ' belonging-together ' ( Ineinandersein ). As Husserl makes clear in the Crisis , the presence of other persons is a necessary condition of the experience of objectivity. The first other experienced is the other living body ( Leib ). The recognition of the body as lived body is the first step towards objectivation (Hua XIV 110).
Husserl ' s phenomenology has much to say about the experience of the self and the manner in which time-consciousness is constituted. But he also recognizes that the truly human life is lived out at the level of the person. As we saw above, Husserl maintains that persons only come into view as persons from a particular standpoint which he calls the ' personalistic attitude ' ( die personalistische Einstellung ). This is not to deny that persons are real entities of a unique kind; it is just that they are disclosed only when we view them from a certain dimension. The specifically personalistic attitude is . . . the attitude we are always in when we live with one another, talk to one another, shake hands with another in greeting, or are related to another in love and aversion, in disposition and action, in discourse and discussion. ( Ideas II § 49, p.192; Hua IV 183)
Husserl contrasts the personalistic attitude with the ' naturalistic attitude ' (which is a specifically scientific attitude as developed in modernity and a subdomain of the more universal natural attitude). Husserl thinks that, while it may be necessary to view the human body as a physical body in order to highlight certain kinds of property (e.g. the body as a physical object in causal interconnection with other physical objects), it is a gross distortion to the human being if it is treated solely in a purely naturalistic manner:
He who sees everywhere only nature, nature in the sense of, as it were, through the eyes of, natural science, is precisely blind to the spiritual sphere, the special domain of the human sciences. ( Ideas II § 51, p. 201; Hua IV 191)
The person is primarily an individual with an identity through changing states (infancy, childhood, maturity), who exercises freedom and is capable of rational actions and responsibilities. The person is oriented to values. Persons in the Kantian tradition are understood as irreducible ends in themselves, deserving of being treated with dignity and respect. The mature Husserl was undoubtedly influenced by the Kantian (and Neo-Kantian) conceptions of the self as person understood as an autonomous (giving the law to itself), rational agent. At the centre of the person, for Husserl, is a drive for reason, but it is a drive sitting upon many other affective and embodied elements (see Chapter 13) . In ' its full concretion ' (Hua XIV 26), it is a self with convictions, values, an outlook, a history, a style and so on. As Husserl writes in Cartesian Meditations : ' The ego constitutes itself for itself in, so to speak, the unity of a history ' (CM, p. 75; Hua I 109). Furthermore, I come to understand myself as person precisely through apprehending others as persons within the wider enabling context of the personal world of ' co-humanity ' ( Mitmenschheit ). We actually live in personal relations with one another, in community with others whom we understand as ' companions, not as opposed subjects but as counter subjects who live " with " one another ' ( Ideas II § 51, p. 204; Hua IV 194). As he writes in 1925:
I direct my interest purely toward the personal, that means, purely toward how persons behave as persons and behave toward one another, how they define themselves and others, how they form friendships, marriages, unions, etc. . . . If I do this, nature as nature is never my theme in all that, neither the physical nor the psychophysical. Husserl has a great deal to say about ' social acts ' and about ' wesubjectivity ' ( Wir-Subjektivit ä t ) and ' I-we ' relations (e.g. Hua XIV 166). In fact, for Husserl, the personal arises out of the social rather than the other way around (Hua XIV 175). There are also communal selves, ' personalities of a higher order ' (XIV 192). We belong in an open-ended, many-layered ' communicative sociality ' ( Kommunicationsgemeinschaft , Hua XIV 194), a term Husserl uses long before it was taken up by Habermas. ' Communication creates unity ' (XIV 199); one consciousness ' coincides ' with another consciousness to form a unity of understanding, of purpose, of shared interests, common ' in-group ' jokes or whatever. This communal consciousness extends into the past. For instance, in the community of philosophers, I can argue with Plato, agree or disagree with his views, admire Aristotle as a person, and so on. The objective world experienced as such through some kind of a priori harmony between myself and other subjectivities in their perception of it. It is co-presence of other subjects perceiving the same object from different sides and in different profiles that allows me to think of the world as common, shared, ' there for all ' ( f ü r Jedermann da ) and so on. Without the mediation of foreign subjectivities, the ' transcendent ' object of my experience would remain merely ' transcendent for me ' , with the possibility that it remained something merely intended as opposed to absolutely transcendent (i.e. apprehended with ' being in itself ' ).
Husserl ' s phenomenology is an extraordinarily rich resource for philosophy of mind. Analytic philosophy of mind -especially as stimulated by philosophers such as Tom Nagel 29 and Wilfrid Sellars, who themselves were influenced by Husserl -has reawakened issues such as the nature of the first-person perspective, individual and collective intentionality, the question as to whether emotions have objects, the nature of empathy, the understanding of free will, the nature of imagination, seeing-in and the entire constitution of the social and cultural world (e.g. in the work of John Searle 30 ). It would indeed be a pity if analytic philosophers continued to ' reinvent the wheel ' without going back to gain some knowledge of the enormous contribution of Edmund Husserl ' s phenomenological investigations.
